Abstract. Against the background of the current discussion of statutory minimum wages in Germany, this paper analyzes the potential employment and fiscal effects of such a policy. Based on estimated labor demand elasticities obtained from a structural labor demand model, the empirical results imply that minimum wages in Germany will be associated with significant employment losses among marginal and low-and semi-skilled full-time workers. Even though minimum wages will lead to increased public revenues from income taxes and social security benefits, they will result in a significant fiscal burden, due to increased unemployment benefits and decreased revenues from corporate taxes.
INTRODUCTION
Hardly any other aspect of German labor market policy is currently debated more intensely than the introduction of statutory minimum wages. Its opponents argue that the installation of such a lower bound for wages into an already heavily regulated labor market threatens to lead to a substantial increase of unemployment. Undoubtedly, most German workers are covered in one way or another by collective bargaining and the German labor market has been plagued by high and persistent unemployment for a long time (see e.g. Haucap et al., 2007) . Its proponents rather point at the large market power that employers wield on the labor market for unskilled workers, arguing that a moderate minimum wage might, at least in principle, create and not destroy jobs. [Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) discuss different theoretical models on the employment effects of minimum wages.]
Advocates of the introduction of a statutory minimum wage feel vindicated by the experience of other countries, because the evidence is not overwhelming that the introduction or the rearrangement of minimum wages in the United Kingdom or the United States, respectively, led to sizable losses of employment. Yet, its skeptics warn that any innocuous results derived in a comparatively low-regulated labor market, such as that of the United Kingdom, can hardly be a sensible guide for what to expect in the German labor market. After all, the German labor market is dominated by corporatist institutions, unions and employer associations alike, and is beset by a plethora of regulations. Thus, yet another piece of regulation seems hardly desirable. What is more, some observers have commented critically on the way that, with the support of strong unions, German labor market incumbents in many sectors have utilized minimum wages to protect themselves against national and international competition. According to this view, the political support for the introduction of a statutory minimum wage from unions and from part of the employers is thus to be viewed as an attempt to extend this protection further, and will have additional negative long-run effects for the German economy (Haucap and Wey, 2008) .
Unfortunately, existing empirical studies on the employment effects of minimum wages do not provide an unambiguous guide to a more serious assessment of these contradictory arguments.
1 These studies typically follow one of two principal identification strategies. Most estimate structural labor demand models and use the estimated substitution elasticities to gauge the employment effects of an introduction or an increase of minimum wage rates. 2 These studies have been criticized because of their strong identification assumptions. In particular, they usually assume a competitive labor market, which appears to be somewhat unrealistic, at least for continental European economies.
More recent studies often take another route and invoke the idea of a natural experiment to estimate the employment effects of minimum wages in specific applications. The analysis by Card and Krueger (1994) is the seminal study using this identification strategy in this context. These studies rely on comparatively weak identification assumptions, but tend to lack external validity, i.e. their results cannot be transferred to other contexts. In addition, 1. Brown (1999) and Neumark and Wascher (2007) provide surveys of the relevant empirical literature. 2. That labor costs might be important for firms' competitiveness and profits has been acknowledged in many contexts, for instance in economic history (Labuske and Streb, 2008) . other than studies applying a structural approach, quasi-experimental studies usually just address short-run effects. Nevertheless, the majority of the existing empirical studies find negative employment effects of minimum wages (Neumark and Wascher, 2007) . So far, the empirical literature on minimum wages has focused exclusively on employment effects. This focus reflects the fact that minimum wages are typically a measure of social policy in economies with a comparatively weak public social security system. By contrast, not only does a minimum wage appear to be an awkward instrument for poverty reduction in a country with a strong public social security system such as Germany, but its introduction may also be associated with significant negative effects on the public budget. To our knowledge, the study by Bachmann et al. (2008) has been the first to suggest that fiscal effects might be an important issue in this context. Our paper refines this study and provides a thorough econometric analysis. Because the concrete level of the statutory minimum wage is a matter of intense political debate, we consider the potential consequences of the introduction of gross hourly minimum wages of h5.00, h7.50 and h10.00, respectively.
Fiscal Effects of Minimum Wages
For such an assessment, we proceed in three steps. First, we use micro-level data to analyze the extent to which the actual wages of German workers would be affected by the introduction of different minimum wage rates (Section 2). To this end, we distinguish five different skill groups and estimate the shares of workers in these groups whose current wages lie below the three minimum wages under discussion, respectively. This step is necessary, because ascertaining that there is any treatment worth considering should always be the initial stage of an evaluation study, and minimum wages that are set below the majority of actual wages will not lead to market reactions.
3 Assuming that the implementation of the statutory minimum wage will lift the wages of those workers currently earning below this threshold up to this value, while leaving the other workers unaffected, we construct an estimate of the associated changes in average wages in all five skill groups.
In a second step, we rely on the wage elasticities estimated in Jacobi and Schaffner (2008) on the basis of a structural labor demand model, to translate these wage changes into the corresponding employment effects for the different types of workers (Section 3). In the final step, the estimates obtained in the first two steps are used to analyze the effects of minimum wages on public revenues and expenditures (Section 4). In Section 5 we derive the policy implications of our findings.
In a nutshell, the results of our empirical analysis suggest that the introduction of a minimum wage rate of h7.50 will lead to an employment reduction of about 625,000 (full-time equivalent) jobs in West and more than 230,000 in East Germany. These employment losses will be concentrated predominantly among marginal workers and low-and semi-skilled full-time workers. The results further indicate that the introduction of a minimum wage of h7.50 will burden the public budget by some h12 billion or about 1% of the total public expenditures in 2007. Thus, the case against the introduction of statutory minimum wages into the German labor market seems quite strong.
MINIMUM WAGES AND THE WAGE DISTRIBUTION
In this section, we assess the effects of several candidate minimum wage rates on the wage distribution. Inspired by the current political discussion of statutory minimum wages in Germany, we discuss the effects of introducing wage floors of h5.00, h7.50 and h10.00, respectively. This step is important for at least two reasons. First, it allows gauging the actual relevance of minimum wages for the labor market. After all, a minimum wage that is lower than the vast majority of wages actually paid in the labor market could not be expected to lead to any market reactions. Second, distinguishing five skill groups of workers we obtain estimates of the increases in average hourly wages in each of these groups that would be associated with the introduction of each of the candidate minimum wages. Because our empirical strategy focuses on the substitutability between different factors of production, i.e. skill groups of workers, these estimates are required for the analytical steps in the following sections.
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for the year 2007, we calculate hourly wage distributions for five different groups of workers: (i) marginal workers; (ii) part-time workers; (iii) full-time workers without an occupational degree (low-skilled); (iv) full-time workers with an occupational degree but without a university degree (semi-skilled); and (v) full-time workers with a university degree (high-skilled). Hourly wages are computed from gross monthly wages and weekly working hours. Weekly hours are defined as the contractual weekly working hours if available, and otherwise as actual weekly working hours as reported by the individuals. Selfemployed and civil servants have been excluded from the sample. Because of potential outliers at the bottom and the top of the wage distribution, we further excluded the lowest and the highest 2.5% of hourly wages from the following calculations.
We also performed all estimations in this paper without trimming the data and when excluding the lowest and highest 5% of the wages, respectively. The estimated effects when trimming the data in this way are slightly lower than those reported below, because fewer individuals are affected by the minimum wage, resulting in a lower wage compression. Accordingly, the estimated effects when not trimming the data are higher because of a higher wage compression. The results for these analyses are available from the authors upon request. Table 1 reports the average hourly wages and their 10th and 90th percentiles, respectively, for the five different groups of workers, always distinguishing East and West German workers. It also documents withingroup wage dispersion in the compressed form of a 90th/10th percentile ratio. In addition, the table reports the aggregate numbers of full-time-equivalent workers in the five different groups we consider, as obtained from the BA Employment Sample. Together with the corresponding system of uncompensated price elasticities, these numbers will be used in the following section to estimate the employment changes associated with the introduction of statutory minimum wages.
Not surprisingly, average hourly wages are higher in West Germany. The average wage of all workers in West Germany taken together exceeds even the average wage of high-skilled workers in East Germany slightly. Thus, we would expect the same candidate minimum wage to induce more serious consequences in East Germany than in the West. Furthermore, as indicated by the ratio of the 90th-10th percentile of the respective wage distribution, wage dispersion appears to be higher in East Germany for all types of workers considered except for the high-skilled workers. It is highest for low-skilled full-time workers in both parts of Germany, while it is only substantial for marginal and part-time workers in East, but not in West Germany.
Based on these hourly wage distributions, we calculate the effects of introducing the candidate minimum wage rates of h5.00, h7.50 and h10.00, respectively, on average hourly wages in all five skill groups. We start from the insight that before implementing the statutory minimum wage, the average wage for skill group j ¼ 1; . . . ; 5; w j , can be expressed as the weighted average of the average wage of all workers earning at most the candidate minimum wage m l , with l 5 5.00, 7.50, 10.00, w À jl , and the average wage of all workers earning more, w þ jl . In this weighted average, the shares of workers receiving wages below and above these candidate minimum wage rates, r À jl and r þ jl ¼ 1 À r À jl , serve as the appropriate weights:
We then construct our estimates of the altered average wages in skill group j after the introduction of the statutory minimum, w jl , assuming that wages above the candidate minimum wages are not affected by their introduction:
Hence, we neglect the possibility that the introduction of a minimum wage shifts the entire wage distribution. In the real world, this might very well occur, though, because, for example, firms attempt to maintain a certain wage differential between different groups of workers to offer appropriate incentives (see, among others, Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994; Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1986) .
To provide an estimate of the magnitudes of the associated wage changes, we construct measures of wage compression (c jl ), defined as the percentage change of the average wage associated with the introduction of candidate minimum wages, i.e.
A detailed table that summarizes the above measures, together with additional descriptive statistics on the wage structure, is provided by Bauer et al. (2008, Table 2 ). The wages of marginal, part-time and low-skilled workers, and in East Germany also of semi-skilled workers, would be affected severely by the introduction of any of the candidate minimum wages. A minimum wage of h5.00, for example, would affect 18% and 56% of low-skilled workers in West and East Germany, respectively. This number increases to approximately 47% and 83%, if a minimum wage of h10.00 were introduced. Among semi-skilled workers, between 2% in West Germany and 6% in East Germany would be affected at a minimum wage of h5.00 and between 13% and 39% at a minimum wage rate of h10.00. Except for a minimum wage of h10.00 in the East, high-skilled workers would hardly be affected by any of the candidate minimum wage rates currently discussed.
In total, taking the employment numbers of the BA Panel into account, a minimum wage of h7.50 would affect about 12% of all full-time-equivalent workers or approximately 19.5% of all workers, which represents about 5 million workers. Using the GSOEP for the year 2004, Kalina and Weinkopf (2006) obtained a very similar result. They calculate that the introduction of such a minimum wage would affect 4.9 million or approximately 15% of all employment relationships. Based on the data from the Gehalts-und Lohnstrukturerhebung of the German Statistical Office for the year 2001, however, Ragnitz and Thum (2007) conclude that only 2.3 million or approximately 14% of all workers receive wages below h7.50. It is unclear which factors are driving these differences between the various studies. Candidate explanations are different samples, different definitions of hourly wages or different sample years. However, all studies indicate that the number of workers likely to be affected is economically relevant.
A minimum wage of h5.00 would only exert small effects on the wage distribution, leading to a wage compression of 1.1% and 5.6% for marginal workers and 1.6% and 22.1% for low-skilled full-time workers in West and East Germany, respectively, while its effects on the average wages of the other groups of workers would be negligible. A minimum wage of h7.50 would, however, lead to significant changes. Such a minimum wage would result in a wage compression of almost 9.3% and 20.3% among marginal workers in T. K. Bauer et al. 
230
West and East Germany, respectively, 6.5% and 48.6% among low-skilled and 2.5% and 9.1% as well as 0.6% and 3.3% among part-time and semi-skilled workers, respectively. Only a minimum wage rate of h10.00 would also affect the wage distribution of (mainly East German) high-skilled workers to a considerable degree. In that case, wage compression for this group of workers would reach approximately 4.2%.
Overall, only a minimum wage considerably above h5.00 would have the potential to affect an economically relevant number of workers in both parts of Germany, in particular marginal, low-skilled and part-time workers. Most specifically, a minimum wage of h7.50 would lead to a sizable wage compression for these groups. Our analysis suggests that the minimum wage rates currently discussed in the German public debate could be expected to lead to considerable reactions on the labor market. Using the estimated changes in the wage distribution for these five different types of workers as impulses, the following section investigates the employment effects of the candidate minimum wages on the basis of empirically determined own-and cross-price elasticities of labor demand.
EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF MINIMUM WAGES
When the government interferes in the labor market by setting the wage for a specific group of workers at a level that exceeds the previous value, this entails two related consequences. First, it raises the relative price of these workers as a factor of production, and thus tends to price a fraction of them out of the market. Correspondingly, at the heart of the public debate concerning the introduction of minimum wages is the question of whether it would lead to substantial losses of employment among workers who are directly affected by this minimum wage. Yet, a comprehensive debate also has to acknowledge that -to the extent that workers of different skill groups are complements or substitutes in the production process -this statutory wage floor will also affect the employment prospect of workers whose wages are considerably higher. Some groups of workers might even benefit as substitutes. Thus, any thorough empirical assessment of the employment effects of minimum wages has to take these relationships into account. That is, it should not only consider own-price elasticities of labor demand but also all relevant cross-price elasticities between different groups of workers.
Furthermore, this intervention raises the costs of production, thus reducing the employers' return on capital, and therefore might lead to a lower aggregate level of economic activity. This second consequence requires the estimation of uncompensated elasticities of labor demand that jointly capture substitution and output effects. By contrast, compensated labor demand elasticities, which are usually applied in the existing literature on labor demand, only capture net substitution effects, i.e. they assume that output is constant (Frondel and Schmidt, 2000) . Because this conventional approach seems to be inadequate, we explicitly assess the magnitudes of the relevant uncompensated elasticities.
Specifically, we provide estimates of the employment effects DL jl of introducing a minimum wage m l for skill group j that are based on the combination of compensated (cross-price) elasticities and scale effects. With L j denoting the number of employees in skill group j, we derive
This expression acknowledges that the introduction of a statutory minimum wage would alter the average wages in all five skill groups. These changes are expressed in percentage terms as Dw kl = w k . They are translated into effects on the employment of workers of each group j by cumulating, first, the compensated price elasticities between skill group j and groups k ¼ 1; . . . ; 5; Z jk , and, second, a corresponding output effect due to the increased cost of labor. This second effect is itself the product of the labor demand elasticity with respect to changes in the output Y, Z jY , and the elasticity of output Y with respect to a change in the price of input factor k. The latter elasticity can be expressed as (a detailed derivation is provided in the appendix of Bauer et al., 2008) :
i.e. as the product of the elasticity of output with respect to the aggregate price Z and the elasticity of marginal costs MC with respect to changes in the price of factor k. Following Fitzenberger and Franz (2001) , the latter can be derived from
As a specific input for our estimation of the employment effects of minimum wages according to expression (4), we re-estimated the compensated price elasticities Z jk estimated by Jacobi and Schaffner (2008) using a bootstrap method to also obtain standard errors for these elasticities. Together with a detailed description of these authors' empirical approach, these elasticities are Bauer et al. (2008) . 4 We further assume constant returns to scale, which implies that Z jY 5 1, and use a demand elasticity of Z 5 À 0.2, inspired by the estimates in Fitzenberger and Franz (2001) .
The estimated uncompensated elasticities are presented in Table 2 . Note that the output effect is the same for all employment reactions triggered by the same wage change, reflecting the assumption of constant returns to scale. Output effects are estimated to be particularly large when the wages of semi-skilled workers increase. The own-wage elasticities are negative and the cross-price elasticities are positive, suggesting that all worker groups are substitutes to each other, even after taking output effects into account. In West Germany, the uncompensated cross-price elasticities between marginal workers and part-time and high-skilled full-time workers are not statistically significant, and in East Germany the cross-price elasticities between marginal part-time workers and all other groups are insignificant, suggesting that this type of workers plays a different role in the production process in the two regions of Germany. Part-time workers appear to be substitutes to semi-skilled and high-skilled workers, whereas the cross-price elasticities between parttime and low-skilled workers do not appear to be statistically significant in both parts of Germany. Finally, different from West Germany, the cross-price elasticities between low-skilled and high-skilled full-time workers in East Germany are not significant. The different elasticities for the two German regions may be explained, among other reasons, with a different industry structure.
Maintaining the assumption explained in the previous section that in each skill group only wages below the minimum wage are affected by its introduction, we use the estimated wage compression associated with different candidate minimum wage rates to approximate the proportionate changes in wage costs ðDw kl = w k Þ resulting from the introduction of minimum wages. The number of employees in the five groups considered (L j ) as well as the respective total wage sums are taken from columns (6) and (7) The estimated employment effects of different minimum wage rates are reported in Table 4 , separately for East and West Germany. According to these estimates, the introduction of each of these candidate minimum wages would have negative employment effects in both parts of Germany, 4. All compensated own-price elasticities are statistically significantly negative. In West Germany, all employment groups are estimated to constitute substitutes for each other. However, most of the substitution elasticities are estimated to be rather small. The highest cross-price elasticities are obtained between semi-skilled workers and the other groups. In East Germany low-skilled and part-time workers as well as high-skilled and low-skilled workers are estimated to be complements. In both cases, however, the estimated elasticities are not statistically significant. 5. Because the elasticities used to evaluate the employment effects are estimates, we also report 95% confidence intervals, which have been obtained using bootstrapping with 500 replications. These confidence intervals are reported in Bauer et al. (2008) . which range from 161,391 employees in East Germany at a minimum wage rate of h5.00 to 1.17 million employees in West Germany at a minimum wage rate of h10.00. These negative effects are mainly the result of decreasing employment among marginal and part-time workers and low-and semiskilled full-time workers, while high-skilled full-time workers are not affected significantly. Overall, the estimates suggest that the introduction of minimum wages in Germany would have detrimental employment effects, which increase with the minimum wage rate. A minimum wage of h5.00, for example, would involve the loss of 523,000 jobs (or 2% of the total workforce), which increases to 1.5 million jobs (or 5.9% of the total workforce) at a minimum wage of h10.00. The part of the estimated effect that is due to the output effect is given in parentheses. The share of the scale effect depends on the worker group and the amount of the minimum wage. Overall, the output effects amount to 6% for a minimum wage of h5.00 and 20% for a minimum wage of h10.00.
Fiscal Effects of Minimum Wages

FISCAL EFFECTS OF MINIMUM WAGES
Based on the employment effects predicted in the previous section, this section analyzes the potential effects of minimum wages for the public budget. For a comprehensive assessment, we separately consider the changes in (i) revenues from individual taxes and social security contributions, (ii) revenues from corporate taxes, (iii) expenditures for unemployment benefits, social assistance and active labor market policy and (iv) expenditures for the supplement of the income of marginal workers, respectively.
Revenues
Minimum wages exert direct as well as indirect effects on public revenues from individual taxes and social security contributions. While the former reflect the altered incomes of workers covered by the minimum wage who remain employed, the latter result from the employment effects. In order to quantify the budgetary effects of candidate minimum wages m l , we calculate the change in the annual labor income of each group of workers j, using our measure of wage compression c jl and the estimated employment changes DL jl . Specifically, denoting average annual wages per full-time-equivalent worker in group j before the introduction of minimum wages as v j and the respective employment level as L j , the change in annual total income due to minimum wages is
As to employment changes, we assume that workers who lose their jobs and unemployed who gain employment receive the average wage in their respective employment group. This assumption may be unrealistic, because, for example, those who lose employment may be clustered at the lower end of the respective wage distribution. The changes in workers' annual incomes are then evaluated by average tax rates. On the revenue side of the public budget, we distinguish the income tax, the solidarity tax as well as social security contributions. Concerning the income tax, we assume tax rates of 3.4% of gross income for low-skilled, 5.1% for semi-skilled and part-time, and 14.4% for high-skilled workers (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007a) . For all five groups of workers, the solidarity tax amounts to 5.5% of the income tax. Social security contributions add up to 40.85% of gross income, consisting of 19.5% for the pension system, 6.5% for the unemployment insurance system, 1.95% for long-term care insurance and 13.9% for the health insurance. Marginal employees are assumed to pay 2% of their gross income for income and solidarity tax. Furthermore, they are assumed to pay the fixed amount of 28% of gross labor income into the social security system. The first two rows of Table 4 report the estimated effects of introducing a minimum wage on individual taxes and social security contributions. Summed over both regions, the effects are estimated to result in a decrease in the revenues from these sources of about h3 billion in the case of a minimum wage of h5.00. This result is driven by a decrease of revenues from these sources in West Germany, 6 where the revenue loss resulting from the employment reduction due to these minimum wages exceeds the revenue gains resulting from the higher incomes of those who remain employed. Even though the introduction of minimum wages would decrease employment and hence reduce the revenues from individual taxes, this negative effect is overcompensated by increased revenues resulting from an increased income of the incumbent employees in the case of minimum wages of h7.50 and h10.00, respectively. Overall, these gains reach about h0.8 billion for a minimum wage of h7.50 and about h8.2 billion for a minimum wage of h10.00. In addition, the positive effects on revenues are the result of employment shifts towards bettereducated workers -and hence towards groups that pay higher income taxesfollowing the introduction of minimum wages.
Note that semi-skilled full-time workers are responsible for most of the additional revenues generated from minimum wages.
7 This group constitutes not only the largest group among those we consider in our analysis, the average income of this group is also substantially higher than the income of low-skilled full-time workers. Finally, semi-skilled workers are substitutes to low-skilled, part-time and marginal workers. Therefore, the introduction of minimum wages will lead only to moderate employment losses and small wage gains for this group.
In addition to individual taxes, we also consider minimum wage effects on corporate tax revenues. The introduction of minimum wages threatens to lower the profits of firms and hence public revenues from corporate taxes for at least two reasons: (i) increases in the labor costs and (ii) negative employment effects and, correspondingly, a lower output level. The following 6. Separate estimates for East and West Germany are available from the authors upon request. 7. The respective contributions of the different worker groups are available from the authors upon request. estimates assume that the increased wage costs and social security contributions of the firms lead to a proportional reduction of profits. This is a crude, albeit reasonable approximation. Firms, for example, may pass on parts of the increased wage costs to the consumers via higher prices, even though the possibilities for such a reaction are limited by increasing global competition.
To the extent that this occurs the following numbers overestimate the true fiscal effects. Minimum wages may also be able to protect monopolies in certain industries, such as the minimum wage in the German postal service sector, or protect German firms from international competition, such as in the construction sector. In these cases, a minimum wage might not affect or even raise profits and hence corporate taxes. On the other hand, our estimates also do not consider the effects of output reductions on firms' profits. This leads to an underestimation of the true fiscal effects. Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine which of these effects dominates. Hence, the net effect of these potential biases cannot be evaluated.
The numbers reported in the third row of Table 4 have been obtained by assuming an average total corporate tax burden from the corporate income tax, business tax and income tax of 25% of profits (see e.g. Gebhardt and Siemers, 2008; Lietmeyer and Petzold, 2005) . For all the scenarios considered, the results show a significant reduction of the public revenues from corporate taxes, reaching between h1.1 billion and h8.2 billion. The majority of this reduction is due to lower revenues in West Germany, while the effects in East Germany are relatively minor. The latter can be explained by the fact that only 20% of the employees are working in East Germany. In addition, workers in the East have lower wages and they work relatively more often part-time than West German workers. Finally, especially in the East, the introduction of minimum wages would lead to relatively strong employment losses. Because of these reasons, a minimum wage would lead to a relatively moderate increase in the wage costs, and hence to a lower estimate of the decrease of profits for East German firms.
Expenditures
Concerning public expenditures, minimum wages and the resulting wage compression and employment effects predominantly affect the budget of the German Labor Office (BA). In our assessment of the effects of minimum wages on the expenditures of the BA for unemployment benefits and active labor market policy, we maintain the following assumptions: (i) labor market flows into and out of employment are exclusively coming from and going into the pool of the unemployed without any change in the population outside the labor force; (ii) the fraction of workers receiving unemployment benefits (ALG I) and not social benefits (ALG II) remains constant (in December 2006, this proportion was about 40%); and (iii) a worker receiving ALG I generates T. K. Bauer et al. The fourth and fifth rows of Table 4 document that the introduction of minimum wages might be associated with significant additional costs for the BA. Aggregated over the two parts of Germany, these costs may reach between h6.7 billion at a minimum wage rate of h5.00 and h19.5 billion at a minimum wage rate of h10.00. In all the scenarios considered, 95% intervals, reported in Bauer et al. (2008) , show that these effects are significant. Again, the largest share of these costs is generated in West Germany, whereas the costs relative to the population share are higher in the East.
Workers with a low income may receive ALG II benefits in addition to labor income. If a minimum wage increases income at the lower end of the wage distribution, the number of workers entitled to these wage subsidies decreases. The associated decrease in expenditures for wage subsidies has to be taken into account when evaluating the fiscal effects of minimum wages. According to the Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2007b), 989,000 households received this type of wage subsidy in January 2007. To quantify the potential effect of reducing this number via minimum wages, we assume that workers having an income of less than h400 receive wage subsidies of h876, those with an income between h400 and h800 receive h751, and those with a higher labor income of h529 per month. We further assume that the latter of these three groups consists predominantly of low-skilled full-time working individuals.
The change in expenditures due to wage subsidies is calculated using the estimated effects on wage compression and employment changes resulting from each candidate minimum wage discussed above. We further assume that workers receiving wage subsidies are affected in the same way as other workers in their respective skill group and that these persons have the same probability of losing their job. If workers receiving wage subsidies lose their job, we assume that they receive ALG I or ALG II. These persons are already taken into account in columns (5) and (6) of Table 4 . If workers stay on their job with a higher wage, we assume that the wage subsidies are reduced by the same amount.
The sixth row of Table 4 shows that the introduction of minimum wages reduces the expenditures for wage subsidies. On the one hand, this reduction can be explained by the fact that those workers who lose their job and get unemployed receive ALG I or ALG II. In this case they are already taken into account. On the other hand, total expenditures for wage subsidies decrease 8. Based on data from the Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2007a) for December 2007, these expenditures consist of average unemployment benefits of h760 per month. To these benefits we add average monthly costs of h350 per person receiving ALG I for measures of active labor market policy (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2006a). We further assume that the average monthly benefits of workers receiving ALG II are h880 (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2006b ) and that these workers on average generate monthly costs for active labor market policy of h160 (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2006c) . Note that we do not consider potential changes in administrative costs, assuming that these costs represent fixed costs of the BA. because the introduction of minimum wages results in some workers currently receiving wage subsidies to lose their entitlement. The reduction of expenditures due to these effects is about h0.6 billion at a minimum wage of h5.00, and h3.2 billion at a minimum wage rate of h10.00. The latter is about 37% of the current expenditures for wage subsidies. The last row of Table 4 summarizes our estimates of the impact of minimum wages on the public budget. Our estimates suggest that the introduction of minimum wages may be accompanied by a considerable fiscal burden, reaching about h10 billion or 9.8% of the total public budget expenditures of h1,016 billion in 2007 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008 ) at a minimum wage rate of h5.00, about h12 billion (or 1.2% of the total public budget in 2007) at a minimum wage rate of h7.50, up to more than h16.6 billion (or 1.6% of the total public budget in 2007) at a minimum wage rate of h10.00. As this fiscal burden is dominated by additional expenditures of the BA for unemployment benefits, it would still add up to about h8.7 billion at a minimum wage rate of h7.50, if one assumed that the profits of firms and hence corporate taxes were not affected by the introduction of minimum wages.
CONCLUSION
Based on estimates of the effects of minimum wages on the wage distribution and employment level, this paper analyzes the fiscal effects of introducing minimum wages in Germany. The employment effects are obtained by estimating labor demand elasticities for different types of workers using a dynamic labor demand model. The introduction of minimum wages in Germany is estimated to have significant employment effects. A minimum wage rate of h7.50, for example, is estimated to decrease (full-time equivalent) employment by almost 0.86 million and a minimum wage rate of h10.00 by more than 1.5 million. These job losses are concentrated among marginal and low-and semi-skilled full-time workers.
Because of higher wages for the incumbent workers and an increase in the demand for high-skilled workers, however, the introduction of minimum wages is associated with an increase in the total labor income, which in turn implies higher public revenues from income tax and social security contributions. The higher wage costs further imply a reduction of firms' profits leading to a decrease in the public revenues from corporate taxes. In total, however, the introduction of minimum wages will decrease public revenues, because the reduction of revenues from corporate taxes cannot be compensated by the revenue gains from income tax and social security contributions. The introduction of minimum wages further leads to increased public expenditures resulting from the increased unemployment and social benefit expenditures.
The results of this paper imply that Germany should abstain from introducing minimum wages. Minimum wages tend to lead to significant T. K. Bauer et al. job losses, especially for those employees whose situation is intended to be meliorated. This suggests that minimum wages are not an effective policy measure to fight poverty. In addition, minimum wages may lead to a substantial fiscal burden. Our analysis implies a fiscal burden that can reach h12 billion at a minimum wage rate of h7.50 and more than h16 billion at a minimum wage rate of h10.00.
